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Résumé
I show that the presence of informed buyers is necessary but not
always sucient for producers to use prices as signals of product qua-
lity.
A suciently high fraction of informed buyers eliminates the le-
mons problem. A small fraction of informed buyers mitigates the le-
mons problem, provided that buyers' prior belief of high quality is
suciently pessimistic : price reveals high quality at a signaling cost
which increases with market power. However, if buyers' prior belief of
high quality is optimistic when the market is poorly informed, then
the lemons problem is not overcome.
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The Inuence of Informed Buyers in
Markets Susceptible to the Lemons
Problem
Introduction
Whatever the degree of competition, markets in which the producer knows
the quality of his good but the buyer does not are susceptible to Akerlof's
(1970) lemons problem : a low-quality good sells at the same price as a
high-quality good because it is impossible for most of the buyers to tell
the dierence between a high and a low quality. The lemons problem is
important to the food sector and to markets for products that generate less
environmental harm such as organically grown agricultural products. The
latter are often either experience or credence goods. Karl and Orwat (1999) or
Cason and Gangadharan (2002) explicitly addresses the issue that consumers
often nd it dicult to identify the environmental quality of clean products.
Similarly, the quality of Bordeaux grands crus can hardly be observed prior to
purchase. When prices alone fail to signal quality, uninformed buyers rely on
private expert opinion, public disclosure programs or the externality exerted
by informed buyers to acquire information. The objective of this paper is to
examine to what extent the presence of informed buyers might be used by
producers to signal quality through prices.
In order to illustrate, consider the market for Bordeaux grands crus. Each
year, the Bordeaux primeur release deals with 80% of the châteaux total
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production. While the wine is still in barrels, hence is not yet mature, the
owners of the foremost châteaux set a price called primeur price. One special
feature of this marketing strategy is that wine becomes an experience good in
the sense of Nelson (1974) since full information on quality is not available to
buyers at the time of purchase. Another feature is that buyers rely on expert
opinion to make their purchase decisions. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that the
primeur release of grands crus is susceptible to Akerlof's (1970) lemons
problem. The four curves that are almost superimposed in Figure 1 depict
the changes in the primeur prices of four grands crus classied as First-
Growth of the appellation Médoc. One can see that these four châteaux have
been setting the same price since 1980 for almost all the vintages. Figure 1
might suggest that, for a given vintage, the wine quality is even regardless of
the château, provided that the primeur price is an eective signal of quality.
However, Figure 2 shows that the scores assigned in January 2002 to the
four wines by Robert Parker, a famous wine expert and editor of The Wine
Advocate, noticeably dier from one château to another. If the expert opinion
provides accurate estimates of quality, then primeur prices have failed to
signal quality at least for the aforementioned châteaux.
This article investigates a signaling model of price in the spirit of Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) or Bagwell and Riordan (1991), which is inspired by the
main features of the Bordeaux grands crus industry.
A wine is a bundle of characteristics : taste, quality, color, aroma, balance,
3
aging potential, location, time, and so on. I consider two dierentiated goods
which dier in taste and quality. Taste is an horizontal characteristic in the
sense that it diers from one buyer to another. On the other hand, quality
is a vertical characteristic and so I assume that there exists a single ranking
of qualities based on the expert opinion, with which all buyers agree1. In my
framework, one good can be seen as a wine produced by one of the foremost
châteaux dominating the Bordeaux wine industry in terms of quality, while
the other good is a second wine sold by lesser known wine producers2. The su-
perior good is more costly to produce than the other good (hence production
techniques determine quality), and it endows the producer with a monopo-
listic position. Furthermore, the superior good is an experience good : all
buyers know that its quality is higher than that of the other good, but some
buyers cannot ascertain whether it is much higher or a little higher. These
dierences in the quality of the superior good are due to exogenous factors,
that is, factors outside the control of the monopolist such as weather (hence
nature also determines the quality of the superior good). The lemons pro-
blem is formally captured by the benchmark that the monopoly price of the
superior product could not signal quality were all buyers uninformed. The
other good is sold by a competitive fringe of small producers and its quality
is perfectly known.
1Robert Parker argues that there are specic standards of quality that full-time wine
professional recognize (quoted in Landon and Smith (1997)).
2Wine producers classied for instance as Crus Bourgeois.
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As a result, whatever the degree of monopoly power, the presence of in-
formed buyers is necessary for the monopoly price to be an eective signal
of quality but not always sucient. A suciently high fraction of informed
buyers eliminates the lemons problem by exerting a negative externality on
the low-quality monopolist. These informed buyers so increase the cost of
pricing for the low-quality monopolist that replicating the high-quality pro-
duct price becomes unprotable. Thus, the condition emphasized by Spence
(1973) for a signal to be eective is met : the high-quality monopolist bears
lower costs for signaling through price. A small fraction of informed buyers
mitigates the lemons problem, provided that buyers' prior belief of high qua-
lity is suciently pessimistic. In the case of such a poorly informed market,
the monopolist bears a signaling cost to reveal the high quality by distorting
his price above the full information level. However, if buyers' prior belief of
high quality is optimistic when the market is poorly informed, then signaling
the true quality is more costly than accepting mimicry for the high-quality
monopolist, and so uninformative prices prevail.
Furthermore, this work evaluates the impact of the monopolist's market
power on price signaling. The main idea is that more market power increases
the signaling cost to reveal high quality because the low-quality monopolist
nds mimicry more attractive : the more market power, the lower the loss of
buyers who refuse to buy at a higher mimicking price.
While the present model is closely related to the work by Bagwell and
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Riordan (1991), their conclusions contrast in three respects with mine. First,
they nd that informed buyers are not necessary for the signaling of a gi-
ven quality. Second, uninformative prices occur only when the fraction of
informed buyers is intermediate. Third, they don't take into account the mo-
nopolist's market power. The main reason for the rst result in Bagwell and
Riordan (1991) is that higher-quality products entail higher costs of produc-
tion. In the present paper, higher-quality products do have a higher cost of
production, but due to uncontrollable factors such as weather, nature in-
troduces randomness into the quality. This simple fact renders crucial the
presence of informed buyers to achieve separation of quality types. The se-
cond result mentioned above stems from Bagwell and Riordan's choice of the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) to prune equilibria. The logic of
undefeated equilibria proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite
(1993) is proved to provide more intuitive insights in the present case. In
particular, this criterion eliminates separating equilibria rather than pooling
equilibria, hence informative prices rather than uninformative prices, when
uninformed buyers are numerous and prone to believe that quality is high.
The idea is that, in such circumstances, it is of no avail to make an eort
to fully reveal that quality is high. I believe this result to be noteworthy,
although it would be spurned by the intuitive criterion.
Basic model with uninformative prices
Following Hotelling, I consider an industry in which two dierentiated
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goods are located at the two endpoints of the segment [0, 1]. Buyers do not
rank both goods in the same way and their heterogeneous tastes are assumed
to be continuously distributed along the segment. The location of a buyer
with taste x is interpreted here as his disutility from buying the less-than-
ideal good located at the left endpoint of the segment (henceforth the left
good). The monetary equivalent losses of the buyer x purchasing the left
good and the good located at the right endpoint of the segment (henceforth
the right good) are tx2 and t (1− x)2 respectively. The parameter t measures
the degree of dierentiation between goods and can also be seen as an index
for the degree of competition.
The left good is assumed to be an experience good, i. e., quality is not
observable to buyers. This good is suciently dierentiated in taste and/or
quality to provide the producer with a monopolistic position, like a First-
Growth wine in Bordeaux3. In contrast, the right good is produced by a
competitive fringe of small producers and its quality is perfectly known to
buyers. This ts the presence in Bordeaux of numerous wines which are close
but imperfect substitutes in taste to a wine classied as First-Growth, and
of lower quality too. An immediate consequence of the competition between
the producers of the right good is that its price drops to marginal cost of
production which I normalize to zero. Hence, the purpose of the present fra-
mework is to focus on the monopoly behavior of the producer of the left good
3Another interpretation could be that a few Bordeaux châteaux among the foremost
ones form a dominant cartel or achieve price collusion.
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(henceforth the monopolist), using t as an index for the degree of monopoly
power. If t = 0, the taste characteristic becomes irrelevant. If t is positive,
the producer of the left good attains some degree of monopoly power.
Moreover, the left good is vertically dierentiated in the sense that all
buyers agree that higher quality is preferable4. The left good is more costly
to produce than the right good, hence the superior quality of the left good is
partly due to production techniques. Nevertheless, some dierences in quality
are assumed to be gifts of nature and so are exogenous to the monopolist.
The quality of the left good takes one of two values, either high (H) or low
(L). The marginal production costs for the left good are constant and equal
to c > 0, regardless of quality. Throughout the paper I shall assume that
L = c : this implies that buyers with taste x < 1/2, who exhibit a personal
preference for the left good, are the only ones to purchase this good when
its quality is low and its price is set at marginal cost. Thus, the monopolist
is able to steal buyers from the competitive fringe of producers only when
the quality of the left product is high.
A crucial feature of the markets considered in this article is that informa-
tion is asymmetric : the monopolist knows the actual quality measured by a
quality index q, while buyers do not5.
4For the Bordeaux primeur release, this amounts to say that the expert predictions
of quality are supposed to be infallible and everybody is agreed on them. An extension of
the present model has been examined to capture the possibility of expert errors. Results
are generally the same as in the present paper except in a particular case, namely when
experts are unanimous on quality regardless of whether they are right or wrong.
5As far as Bordeaux grands crus are concerned, Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1996) stress
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The expected utility of a buyer with taste x and income R purchasing
the left good is given by R + q − p− tx2 if he purchases a good of quality q
at price p, and R if he does not buy. On the other hand, if the same buyer
(x, R) purchases the right good, he obtains the utility R−t(1−x)2. I suppose
that buyers buy at most one unit of the dierentiated good. I also assume
that R is large enough for all buyers to nd a product for which their utility
is positive (in equilibrium). The market is split at the marginal buyer with
taste x̃ ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
R + q − p− tx̃2 = R− t(1− x̃)2
This implies a linear demand function D (p) ≡ x̃ = (q + t− p) /2t for the
left good, as long as this is non-negative and does not exceed 1. Note that
the demand price elasticity
∣∣∣∂D(p)∂p pD(p) ∣∣∣ = pq+t−p decreases with the degree of
monopoly power.
As the actual quality of the left good is not observable to buyers, they
must rely on their beliefs about quality when deciding to purchase the good.
The monopolist, in turn, will have to take into account how his choice of
price aects the buyers' beliefs. Observing p, buyers try to infer some infor-
mation about quality and update their beliefs. Let µ (p) denote the buyers'
posterior belief that quality is H when the price is p. If the buyers assign
probability µ = µ (p) to the high quality, then q(µ) ≡ µH + (1− µ) c is the
that weather information concerning a whole area is publicly available, while local weather
phenomena that mar the grapes, such as hails, remains the château's private information.
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buyers' perception of quality upon seeing p and the monopolist's demand is
represented by the demand curve
D(p, µ) = (q(µ) + t− p) /2t. (1)
Let µ0 be the prior probability assigned to the quality being H. This belief
is common knowledge : it summarizes all the information that is publicly
available in popular quality reports6. For instance, it includes information on
weather and reputation7.
When buyers perfectly identify quality, the monopolist with quality q has
a prot function explicitly dened by (p− c) (q + t− p) /2t. Thus, (q−c+t)2
8t
is
the maximum prot he can get by charging his full information price q+c+t
2
.
Clearly, when q or t increase, the left good becomes more dierentiated from
the right good either in quality or in taste, enhancing the market power of
the monopolist who, in turn, raises his price.
When buyers cannot ascertain quality, the monopolist may choose either
to fully reveal information on quality through separating prices, or to conceal
information through pooling prices. Let us rst show the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 When all buyers are uninformed, prices fail to signal quality.
6In the case of Bordeaux wine, there are numerous guides and reviews such as La Revue
du Vin de France, La Lettre du Club Vinophile, the annual Bordeaux issue of the Wine
Spectator which provides a wine quality index that takes into account factors such as color,
aroma, avour, balance, complexity and aging potential.
7Following Landon and Smith (1997), information on the past quality performance of
Bordeaux châteaux largely inuences the buyers' beliefs on current quality.
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Suppose that the price p does reveal high quality. Then the monopolist
must not be able to duplicate such a price when his product is of low quality.
His demand when doing so would be D(p, 1) = (H + t− p) /2t, hence he
would make a mimicking prot of (p− c) (H + t− p) /2t, whereas his maxi-
mized prot is t
8
when quality is perfectly identied. Therefore, to signal the
high quality, the price p must satisfy
(p− c) (H + t− p) /2t ≤ t
8
. (2)
However, t
8
is also the opportunity cost that the high-quality monopolist
must bear to reveal quality since it is the highest prot that he can make
when he is believed to sell a low-quality product. Thus, the high-quality
monopolist nds it protable to charge an informative price p yielding a
prot (p− c) (H + t− p) /2t, provided that
(p− c) (H + t− p) /2t > t
8
. (3)
This contradicts inequality (2). As in the lemons problem identied by
Akerlof (1970), the equilibrium price cannot be informative.
The reason why there is no separating equilibrium is that pricing entails
the same cost regardless of quality, that is, namely the monopolist's prot in
the absence of informed buyers, (p− c) D(p, µ), has the same derivative with
respect to p for all q.
In fact, the high- and low-quality monopolists charge the same price in
equilibrium. Given that buyers assign a prior probability µ0 to the high-
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quality monopolist, such a price p must yield a prot no lower than t
8
, which
is what the monopolist could get at best, were he thought to be low-quality, i.
e., (p−c) (q(µ0) + t− p) /2t ≥ t8 . Obviously, this inequality holds for innitely
many equilibrium prices.
Nevertheless, some equilibrium prices are less plausible than others. To
discard them, it is useful to apply the logic of Undefeated Equilibrium (UE)
proposed by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993). Dene π∗q and
π#q as the equilibrium prots of the monopolist selling quality q at prices
p∗q and p#q respectively. Furthermore, let µ∗ (p) be the posterior belief held
after observing p, that sustains p∗q as an equilibrium. Following Mailath,
Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993), the equilibrium price p∗q survives
the UE criterion, provided that there does not exist another equilibrium p#q
defeating p∗q, i. e. :
If p#H = p#L , (4)
then π#q ≥ π∗q for q = H, L with one inequality strict and µ∗
(
p#H
)
6= µ0.
If p#H 6= p#L , (5)
then π#H > π∗H , π#L ≤ π∗L and µ∗
(
p#H
)
6= 1.
The existence of such an equilibrium p#q would induce the monopolist to
deviate from p∗q. Some persuasive arguments in favor of the UE criterion can
be found in Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993). In the present
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context, the logic of this renement is parallel to a Pareto dominance argu-
ment in reference to the monopolist only. As the monopolist is potentially
of two quality types, both of these types should not be wastefully competi-
tive with themselves. In the case without informed buyers, the UE criterion
singles out the equilibrium price (q(µ0) + c + t)/2 = arg maxp(p− c)D(p, µ0)
simply because it is the equilibrium that Pareto dominates all the other
pooling equilibria from the monopolist's viewpoint. Clearly, there does not
exist another pooling equilibrium such that requirement (4) is met, hence
the monopolist is not tempted to deviate from (q(µ0) + c + t)/2, whatever
his quality.
Lemma 2 When all buyers are uninformed, the monopolist charges the
uninformative UE price (q(µ0) + c + t)/2.
Lemma 2 states the existence of a lemons problem in the market un-
der consideration, in that the monopolist has no way of signaling quality
through price. Such a situation prevailing in the absence of informed buyers
will serve as a benchmark to shed light on the role of informed buyers. Fur-
thermore, the only reasonable prediction is that the monopolist will choose
the uninformative price (q(µ0) + c + t)/2 which depends on the buyers' prior
information about quality. The reason why prices fail to signal quality is that
the cost of pricing does not depend on the level of quality. As the incentive
to tell buyers about quality through price is not higher for a monopolist
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with a high-quality product, mimicry can emerge : the low-quality monopolist
charges the same price as his high-quality counterpart, hence prevents buyers
from learning the true quality and turns their misinformation to prot.
In the remainder of the article, we shall see that the presence of informed
buyers enables prices to signal quality because it lowers the cost of pricing
for the monopolist when quality is higher.
The model with informed buyers
Let us now assume that some buyers can ascertain the quality of the left
good. A fraction I of buyers, say the readership of reviews publishing accu-
rate advice on quality, learn the product quality before purchase, while the
remaining fraction 1−I of buyers believe that quality is high with probability
µ. Then the total demand is
D(p, q, µ) ≡ ID(p) + (1− I)D(p, µ) (6)
= (φq(µ) + t− p) /2t,
where φq(µ) ≡ Iq + (1− I)q(µ), q = H, L.
The prot of a monopolist selling a product of true quality q at a price
p, that is believed to be of quality H with probability µ, is now given by
πq(p, µ) = (p− c)D(p, q, µ). This is a strictly concave function with a single
turning point at φq(µ)+c+t
2
, which yields a maximized prot of (φq(µ)−c+t)2
8t
.
The presence of informed buyers modies the framework in a crucial way.
From (6), the monopolist's marginal benet from slightly increasing the price
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can now be expressed as
∂πq(p, µ)
∂p
= Iq/2t + ((1− I)q(µ) + t + c− 2p)/2t, q = H, L. (7)
It is instructive to note that the right-hand side expression depends on
q only in the rst term. The marginal benet is higher for a higher-quality
monopolist provided that I > 0. This single-crossing property no longer holds
in the absence of informed buyers.
I shall denote by pIH and pIL the separating prices for the high quality
and the low quality respectively. The corresponding equilibrium prots will
be πIH and πIL. Since the monopolist selling a product of one quality has the
option to pretend to sell a product of another quality, the separating prices
must satisfy the requirements ensuring that revealing the actual quality is
protable. When quality is perfectly identied, the low-quality monopolist
earns more by charging his full information price 2c+t
2
than any other price.
Thus, pIL = 2c+t2 is the only separating price open to the low-quality mono-
polist. On the other hand, when the low-quality monopolist is thought to be
high-quality after choosing a price p, he faces a demand D(p, L, 1) and has a
mimicking prot πL(p, 1) = (p−c) (φL(1) + t− p) /2t. To achieve separation,
the high-quality monopolist must set a price pIH that satises the condition
πL(p
I
H , 1) ≤ πIL, (8)
Otherwise, the low-quality monopolist would strictly prefer to spurn pIL
and choose pIH . Note that the derivative of the mimicking prot in the left-
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hand side of (8) with respect to p decreases with I, namely ∂2πL(p,1)
∂p∂I
= (c −
H)I < 0. In other words, the more informed the market, the more dicult
it is fooling buyers. I shall denote respectively by L the set of prices dened
by requirement (8) and by pIL the upper root solving the equality version of
(8)(see Appendix 1 for more details). The constraint to choose a price in L to
avoid mimicry may distort the price charged by the high-quality monopolist
with respect to the full information case, hence creating a signaling cost.
Moreover, if the high-quality monopolist quotes a price p on the basis of
which he is believed to sell low quality, then he makes a prot πH(p, 0) = (p−
c) (φH(0) + t− p) /2t. Maximizing this prot by setting the price φH(0)+c+t2 ,
would give him a prot of (φH(0)−c+t)2
8t
. This can be interpreted as the op-
portunity cost to signal high quality, which increases with the number of
informed buyers since φH(0) increases with I. Thus, the more informed the
market, the weaker the incentive to reveal information through price. The
separating price pIH must be such that
πH(p
I
H , 1) >
(φH(0)− c + t)2
8t
. (9)
Otherwise the high-quality monopolist would deviate to φH(0)+c+t
2
, no mat-
ter what inferences buyers might draw from the observation of such a price.
Let H denote the interval of prices for which condition (9) is met.
In order to reveal quality, the high-quality monopolist must choose a
separating price pIH in the set L ∩H, which turns out to be non empty for
all I > 0 (see the proof in Appendix 2). As a result, informed buyers are
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necessary for the price to be an eective signal of high quality. To state the
result in Proposition 1, I dene the function
I(t) ≡ 2t + H − c
2(t + H − c)
,
where I = I(t) solves equation pIL− H+c+t2 = 0, that is, pIL is equal to the
full information price for the high quality product (see Appendix 3 for further
calculations). In Figure 3, the function I = I(t) represents the borderline
between the two regions I and II. Proposition 1 states that the monopolist
sells both the low- and high-quality products at the full information price for
the parameter values in region I, hence, the lemons problem is fully solved
due to the presence of informed buyers. On the other hand, the monopolist
charges a price exceeding the full information price to reveal high quality
for values of I and t in region II. For these values, the presence of informed
buyers mitigates the lemons problem since buyers can infer the true quality
from observing the monopoly price. Nevertheless, they pay a signaling cost
through the price distortion when purchasing the high-quality product.
Proposition 1 Separation is achieved provided that I > 0. All the revea-
ling prices are defeated by the following pair of least-costly revealing prices :
 pIL = 2c+t2 for the low-quality product,
 and pIH =
{
H+c+t
2
if I ≥ I(t),
pIL otherwise, for the high-quality product.
The presence of informed buyers enables prices to signal quality because
it lowers the cost of pricing when quality is higher. There is a conict between
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two eects, due to the presence of informed buyers. First, the mimicking pro-
t, hence the temptation to mimic for the low-quality monopolist, decreases
with I. Second, the opportunity cost to reveal high quality increases with I.
However, the former eect dominates the latter for prices inside L ∩H : for
these prices, the low-quality monopolist does not nd it protable to imitate
the price set by the high-quality monopolist. There are now buyers who can
ascertain the product quality on the market and, hence, are not fooled. It
follows that increasing price has become more damaging to the low-quality
monopolist. The price can now function as an eective signal of quality.
There exists a range of prices, namely L ∩H, at which the high-quality
monopolist can protably distinguish himself. However, from requirement
(5), the price entailing the least costly signal defeats all the other revealing
prices. Some calculations given in Appendix 3 show that there are two cases
to consider, depending on the value of I. First, if the fraction of informed
buyers is higher than the threshold I(t), then the full information price for
the high quality product, i. e. H+c+t
2
, is inside L ∩H, and so will be chosen
by the monopolist to signal high quality. When the market is suciently well
informed, signaling the true quality is possible at no cost. Second, if I is
lower than I(t), signaling the true quality is still possible, albeit at a positive
cost for the high quality. In this case, the full information price H+c+t
2
does
not belong to L ∩H, thus the high-quality monopolist must distort his price
above the full information price to prevent the low-quality monopolist from
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mimicking. By charging pIL, the high-quality monopolist minimizes the loss
of buyers resulting from the upward distortion. The signaling cost incurred
by the high-quality monopolist is then measured by the dierence (H−c+t)2
8t
−
πH(p
I
L, 1), where (H−c+t)
2
8t
is the full information prot when the product is of
high quality. One can easily check from Appendix 3 that pIL decreases with
I. The signaling cost declines as the fraction of informed buyers increases,
until this fraction reaches the threshold I(t) above which the signaling cost
vanishes and so, too, the lemons problem.
What is the impact of the monopoly power on the signaling activity ?
From Appendix 3, pIL−H+c+t2 increases with t, meaning that the more market
power that the monopolist has, the higher the price distortion to signal high
quality. It follows from the single-crossing condition stated in (7) that the low-
quality monopolist nds mimicry unattractive whatever his market power.
As market power drops, it becomes increasingly costly for the low-quality
monopolist to duplicate the high-quality price since demand is more elastic :
the more competitive the market, the more damaging the loss of buyers who
refuse to buy at a higher price.
The emergence of separating prices due to the presence of informed buyers
does not dismiss uninformative prices. Recall that µ0 ∈ (0, 1) is the initial
probability assigned by buyers to the high quality. Let pI denote an uninfor-
mative price. Since it is the same price charged by the monopolist, regardless
of quality, the buyers' posterior beliefs after observing this price are the same
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as their prior beliefs. The monopolist earns πq(pI , µ0) with the uninformative
price pI , if such a price does exist. To exist, it suces that pI satises the
two following conditions :
πq(p
I , µ0) ≥
(φq(0)− c + t)2
8t
, q = H, L. (10)
Any price yielding a prot in both states of nature, no lower than the
right-hand side of (10)  that is, what the monopolist could get at best if
he were thought to be of low quality with certainty , is a candidate for
concealing information. Note that letting the low-quality monopolist mimic
is costly for the high-quality monopolist : the loss in prot with respect to
the full information situation is given by (H−c+t)2
8t
− πH(pI , µ0). Moreover,
requirement (5) imposes the further restriction on pI :
πH(p
I
H , 1) ≤ πH(pI , µ0). (11)
If inequality (11) holds, then the high-quality monopolist is better o
with the uninformative price pI than with the separating price pIH . Since the
low-quality monopolist will also nd it more protable to imitate pI than
to reveal information, requirement (11) guarantees that the uninformative
equilibrium defeats the least-costly separating equilibrium in the sense of
Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1993). In such a case, it is more
plausible that quality will not be revealed in equilibrium. Clearly, if the mar-
ket is suciently well informed so that I ≥ I(t), then (11) is not met since
πH(p
I
H , 1) =
(H−c+t)2
8t
, which is the full information prot level. But when
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I < I(t), the returns from signaling high quality with pIH = pIL are lower
than (H−c+t)2
8t
. Thus, (11) will hold for suciently high values of µ0. More
accurately, let µ dene the unique probability µ such that
πH(p
I
L, 1) =
(φH(µ)− c + t)2
8t
. (12)
The right-hand side of (12) is the maximum prot that the high-quality
monopolist can make by holding back information, when buyers believe the
product to be of high quality with probability µ. The critical value µ is the
level of beliefs such that the high-quality monopolist is indierent between
signaling quality at some cost and concealing information about quality. If
µ0 is strictly lower than µ, then inequality (11) is violated regardless of the
uninformative price pI considered. Consequently, it is more plausible that
information will be revealed in equilibrium. The result is reversed for values
of µ0 higher than µ. Then, the monopolist will prefer to conceal his private
information about the quality of the product. In Figure 4, µ is depicted as
a function of t and I, for t ∈ [0, 5] , I ∈ [0, 1/2] and H − c = 18. It shows
that, given I, µ declines for higher values of t. Thus, it is more likely that the
monopolist conceals his private information as his market power increases.
Proposition 2 The presence of informed buyers is necessary for price
to be an eective signal of quality, but not always sucient in the following
8Equation (12) has a unique positive root which has the following expression for H−c =
1 :
µ =
[
2 (I − 1) (I + t) +
√
4(I + t)2(1− I)2 − 4I (1− I)2 (3I − 2)− 2
√
(1− I) (1− I + 2t)
]
/2 (1− I)2 .
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sense :
1. If I ≥ I(t), then separation is achieved at no signaling cost with the
full information prices pIL =
2c+t
2
and pIH =
H+c+t
2
.
2. if I < I(t), then
(a) separation is achieved at a signaling cost with the pair of UE prices
pIL =
2c+t
2
and pIH = pIL, provided that µ0 ≤ µ ;
(b) separation fails and a continuum of uninformative UE prices pre-
vails for all µ0 > µ.
Proposition 2 summarizes all the results in the model with informed
buyers. If the market is well informed, the presence of informed buyers elimi-
nates the lemons problem by increasing the cost of pricing for a lower-quality
monopolist so much that mimicking becomes unprotable (case 1). If the
market is poorly informed (case 2), the presence of informed buyers miti-
gates the lemons problem, provided that buyers' prior beliefs of high quality
are suciently pessimistic (case 2.a) ; due, for instance, to bad weather or a
bad reputation. In this case, the monopolist must incur a signaling cost to
reveal high quality by distorting his price above the full information price.
However, optimistic prior belief of high quality when the market is poorly in-
formed (case 2.b) causes separation to fail because signaling the true quality
is more costly than accepting mimicry for the high-quality monopolist.
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Conclusion
This article investigates to what extent the presence of informed buyers
permits price to credibly signal quality in markets that are susceptible to a
lemons problem. As a general result, informed buyers are necessary but not
always sucient for a monopolist to use prices as signals of product qua-
lity, regardless of the monopoly power. The essential eect of the presence of
informed buyers is to reduce the benet accruing to a low-quality monopo-
list from mimicking his high-quality counterpart. This in turn increases the
incentive for signaling high quality through price.
If the market is poorly informed, then the monopolist's price will signal
the actual quality provided that buyers a priori hold pessimistic beliefs about
high quality. Such beliefs may be due either to unfavorable weather reports
or to bad quality performances in the past that have spoilt the monopolist's
reputation. Nevertheless, the price is not restored as a signal of quality wi-
thout entailing some cost. To signal high quality, the price must be distorted
above the full information level : the monopolist sacrices buyers to prove
that quality is high. The signaling cost increases with monopoly power. It be-
comes a too high burden when numerous buyers are uninformed and a priori
hold optimistic beliefs on high quality. In such a case, the high-quality mono-
polist is better o choosing uninformative prices, hence the lemons problem
is not overcome.
These results shed light on the lemons problem identied in Figures 1
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and 2. There is evidence that the primeur price has never been an eective
signal of quality since 1982 for the châteaux under consideration. The most
general explanation can be found in Spence (1976) : For a signal to be ef-
fective, it must be unprotable for sellers of low quality products to imitate
it. Obviously, the cost of using primeur price as a signal of quality is the
same for the four Médoc châteaux endowed with dierent qualities. The main
insight that the present analysis adds is that the market is poorly informed
and buyers a priori hold optimistic beliefs about the quality oered by the
four châteaux. The high reputation of the four châteaux may explain why
uninformed buyers unrealistically believe quality to be high before purchase.
That the market is poorly informed means that either few buyers rely on
expert opinion or few buyers develop sucient skills to estimate the true
quality. This is consistent with two empirical studies on the Bordeaux wine
industry : Landon and Smith (1997) nd no evidence that buyers use ex-
pert predictions when purchasing Bordeaux wine and Ashenfelter and Jones
(1998) argue that expert opinion neglects some information that is useful in
making predictions, such as weather data.
The explanation above as to why some châteaux are better o charging
uninformative primeur prices does not exhaust the subject. Further research
is necessary to determine whether the practice of concealing information
obeys insurance motives or serves as a coordinating device in a situation of
repeated competition. Moreover, it may be instructive to extend the present
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analysis by considering that the Bordeaux primeur release has the features
of forward trading. A model along this line can be found in Mahenc and
Meunier (2003). This work exhibits forward pooling equilibria which can be
here interpreted as follows : low-quality producers earn positive speculative
prots by selling forward at primeur prices that are both uninformative and
upward-distorted, while high-quality producers need uninformative primeur
prices to reduce the cost of signaling quality on the market of bottled-wine.
Appendix
Appendix 1. The set L
Requirement (8) can be rewritten
(pIH − c)
(
φL(1) + t− pIH
)
/2t− t/8 ≤ 0, (13)
which holds only for prices pIH in the set
L ≡
[
c,
(
φL(1) + c + t−
√
φL(1) + c + t)2 − 4c(φL(1) + t)− t2
)
/2
]
∪
[(
φL(1) + c + t +
√
(φL(1) + c + t)2 − 4c(φL(1) + t)− t2
)
/2, H + t
]
, where
pIL ≡
(
φL(1) + c + t +
√
(φL(1) + c + t)2 − 4c(φL(1) + t)− t2
)
/2
=
(
H − I(H − c) + c + t +
√
(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1− I) + 2t)
)
/2.
Appendix 2. The set H
Condition (9) can be rewritten
(pIH − c)
(
H + t− pIH
)
/2t− (φH(0)− c + t)2/8t > 0. (14)
This inequality is met for prices pIH in the interval
H ≡ ((H + c + t−
√
(H + c + t)2 − (φH(0)− c + t)2 − 4c(H + t))/2,
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(H + c + t +
√
(H + c + t)2 − (φH(0)− c + t)2 − 4c(H + t))/2)
= ((H + c + t−
√
(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1 + I) + 2t))/2,
(H + c + t + √(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1 + I) + 2t))/2).
It follows that, for all I > 0,
pIL =
(
H − I(H − c) + c + t +
√
(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1− I) + 2t)
)
/2
<
(
H + c + t +
√
(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1 + I) + 2t)
)
/2.
Thus, for all I > 0, the set L ∩H is non empty.
Appendix 3. The price distortion for high quality
The price distortion to reveal high quality can be expressed as follows
pIL−
H + c + t
2
=
(
−I(H − c) +
√
(H − c)(1− I)((H − c)(1− I) + 2t)
)
/2.
(15)
It can be seen that this distortion decreases with I and increases with t.
Moreover, straightforward calculations give that pIL − H+c+t2 ≤ 0 for all
I ≥ I(t).
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Figure 1. Primeur prices of 4 Médoc grands crus
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Figure 2. Parker's scores for 4 Médoc grands crus
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Figure 3. Parameter values for price distortion
